In the tollbooth problem, we are given a tree T = (V, E) with n edges, and a set of m customers, each of whom is interested in purchasing a path on the tree. Each customer has a fixed budget, and the objective is to price the edges of T such that the total revenue made by selling the paths to the customers that can afford them is maximized. An important special case of this problem, known as the highway problem, is when T is restricted to be a line.
Introduction
Consider the problem of pricing the bandwidth along the links of a network such that the revenue obtained from customers interested in buying bandwidth along certain paths in the network is maximized. Suppose that each customer declares a set of paths she is interested in buying, and a maximum amount she is is willing to pay for each path. The network service provider's objective is to assign single prices to the links such that the total revenue from customers who can afford to purchase their paths is maximized. Recently, numerous papers have appeared on the computational complexity of such pricing problems [1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 11, 15, 16, 8] .
A special case of this problem, where each customer is interested in purchasing only a single path (single-minded), and where there is no upper bound on the number of customers purchasing each link (unlimited supply) was studied by Guruswami et al. [15] , under the name of tollbooth problem. The authors of [15] showed that the problem is already APX-hard when the network is restricted to be a tree, and also presented a polynomial time algorithm for the case when all paths start at a certain root of the tree. In [15] , the authors also studied the highway problem, a further restriction where the tree is a path, and gave polynomial time algorithms when either the budgets are bounded and integral, or all paths have a bounded length.
In this paper, we continue the study of these problems. For the tollbooth problem, the best known approximation factor was O(log n + log m), where n and m are respectively the number of edges of the tree and the number of customers. This result applies in fact for general sets [15] , and not necessarily paths of a network, and even in the non single-minded case [4] . Very recently, and more generally, Cheung and Swamy [8] gave an algorithm that, given any LP-based α-approximation algorithm for maximizing the social welfare under limited supply, returns a solution with profit within a factor of α log u max of the maximum, where u max is the maximum supply of an item. In particular, this gives an O(log m)-approximation for the tollbooth problem on trees. In this paper, we give an O(log n)-approximation which is an improvement over the O(log m) since n ≤ 3m can be always assumed. We also show that if all the paths are going towards a certain root, then a (1 − ǫ)-approximation can be obtained in quasi-polynomial time. This result extends a recently developed quasi-PTAS [10] for the highway problem, and uses essentially the same technique. However, there is a number of technical issues that have to be resolved for this technique to work on trees; most notably is the use of the Separator Theorem for trees, and the modification of the price-guessing strategy to allow only for one-sided guesses.
The existence of a quasi-PTAS for the highway problem indicates that a PTAS or even an FPTAS is still a possibility, since the problem was only known to be weakly NP-hard [6] . In the last section of this paper, we show that the highway problem is indeed strongly NP-hard and hence admits no FPTAS unless P=NP.
Balcan et al. [3] considered a model in which some items can be priced below zero (in the form of a discount) so that the overall profit is maximized. They gave a 4-approximation for the uniform budgets case, and a quasi-PTAS for a special case in which there is an optimal pricing that has only a bounded number of negatively priced items. Here we show that the existence of a quasi-PTAS in the general case is highly unlikely, by showing that the problem is APX-hard.
In the next section, we give a formal definition of the problem. In Section 3, we give a O(log n) approximation for trees and in Section 4 we give a quasi-PTAS for the case of uncrossing paths. We conclude in Section 6.
2 The tollbooth problem on trees
Notation
Let T = (V, E) be a tree. We assume that we are given a (multi)set of paths I = {I 1 , . . . , I m }, defined on the set of edges E, where I j = [s j , t j ] ⊆ E is the path connecting s j and t j in T. For I j ∈ I, we denote by B(I j ) ∈ R + the budget of path I j , i.e., the maximum amount of money customer j is willing to pay for purchasing path I j . In the tollbooth problem, denoted henceforth by Tb, the objective is to assign a price p(e) ∈ R + for each edge e ∈ E, and to find a subset J ⊆ I, so as to maximize
subject to the budget constraints
where, for I ∈ I, p(I) = e∈I p(e).
For a node w ∈ V , let I[w] ⊆ I be the set of paths that pass through w. In section 4, we will assume that the tree is rooted at some node r ∈ V . The depth of T, denoted d(T), is the length of the longest path from the root r to a leaf. For a node w ∈ V , we denote by T(w), the subtree of T rooted at w (excluding the path from the parent of w to r), and for a subtree T ′ of T we denote by V (T ′ ), E(T ′ ) and I(T ′ ) the vertex set, edge set, and set of intervals contained completely in T ′ , respectively.
Preliminaries
In the following sections, we denote by p * : E → R + an optimal set of prices, and by Opt ⊆ I the set of intervals purchased in this optimum solution. For a subset of intervals I ′ ⊆ I, and a price function p : E → R + , we denote by p(I ′ ) = I∈I ′ p(I) the total price of intervals in I ′ .
It easy to see that n ≤ 3m may be assumed without loss of generality. Indeed, if we root the tree at some vertex r, then for every vertex v ∈ V , we may assume that there is either an interval I ∈ I beginning at v or an interval I ∈ I that passes through two different children of v; otherwise, every interval through v must contain its parent u (unless v = r in which case all edges incident to r can be contracted), and hence we can contract the edge e = {u, v} and increase by p * (e) the prices of each the edges {v, v ′ } for each child v ′ of v.
Let ǫ > 0 be a given constant.
Proposition 1 ([10])
Let p * be an optimal solution for a given instance of Tb, and ǫ > 0 be a given constant. Then there exists a price functionp : E → R + for which (i)p(e) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , P }, for every e ∈ E, where P = nm/ǫ, (ii)p(I) ≤
B(I)
1+ǫ , for every I ∈ Opt, and
We shall call the set of pricesp satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1, ǫ-optimal prices.
We will make use of the following well-known separator result for trees. 
Such a separator can be found in linear time.
This gives a recursive partitioning of T in the following standard way: Let v 0 be a separator vertex in T and T 1 , . . . , T r be the components of T − v 0 . Recursively, find separator vertices v 1 , . . . v r in T 1 , . . . , T r . We say that node v 0 has level(v 0 ) = 1, nodes v 1 , . . . , v r have level 2, and in general if node v is a separator vertex in the subtree T ′ obtained by deleting one-higher level separator vertex v ′ then level(v) = level(v ′ ) + 1. By (3), the maximum number of levels k in this decomposition is at most log 3/2 n. We shall denote by N (T) the set of separator nodes used in the full decomposition of T.
3 An O(log n) approximation for the tollbooth problem on trees
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 There is a deterministic O(log n)-approximation algorithm for Tb.
The proof goes along the same lines used in [2] to obtain an O(log n)-approximation for the highway problem. The algorithm consists of 3 main steps: Partitioning, "randomized cut", and then dynamic programming. We can then derandomize it to obtain a deterministic algorithm.
We say that the given set of paths I is rooted, if all the paths in I start at some node r, called the root of T. We will also make use of the following theorem.
Theorem 2 ([15])
The tollbooth problem on rooted paths can be solved in polynomial time using dynamic programming.
For i = 1, . . . , k, let I(i) = {I ∈ I : i is the smallest level of a separator vertex v ∈ N (T) contained in I}.
Then I = ∪ i∈[k] I(i) and I ∩J = ∅ for all I, J ∈ I(i) that contain distinct separators at level i. Let (Opt, p * ) be an optimal solution. Then,
Thus if we solve k independent problems on each of the sets I(i), i = 1, . . . , k, and take the solution with maximum revenue, we get a solution of value at least p * (Opt)/k. Thus it remains to show the following result. Proof. Let v 1 , . . . , v r be the nodes adjacent to v. Note that each path I ∈ I can be divided into two sub-paths starting at v; we denote them by I 1 and I 2 . We use the following procedure.
1. Let X ⊆ {v 1 , . . . , v r } be a subset obtained by picking each v i randomly and independently with probability 1/2.
2. Let I ′ = {I j ∈ I : j ∈ {1, 2}, I j contains exactly one vertex of X}.
3. Use dynamic programming (cf. Theorem 2) to get an optimal solution (J , p) on the instance defined by I ′ and the tree T ′ with root v and sub-trees rooted at the children in X.
Extend p with zeros on all the other arcs not in T ′ , and return (J , p).
Let (Opt, p * ) be an optimal solution. We now argue that the solution returned by this algorithm has expected revenue of p * (Opt)/8. Clearly, for every I ∈ I, either p * (I 1 ) ≥ p * (I)/2 or p * (I 2 ) ≥ p * (I)/2; let us call this more profitable part by I * . Then I∈Opt p * (I * ) ≥ p * (Opt)/2. Let Opt ′ = {I ∈ Opt : I * contains exactly one vertex of X}. Note that with probability at least 1/4 each I ∈ Opt has I * intersecting the random set X in exactly one vertex. In particular,
Since what our procedure returns is at least as profitable as this quantity, the theorem follows.
The randomized algorithm above can be derandomized using the method of pairwise independence [17, 18, 2] .
Uncrossing paths
Here we assume that the tree is rooted at some node r ∈ V , and that paths in I have the following uncrossing property: If I = [s, t] ∈ I then t lies on the path [s, r]. This property implies that once paths in I meet they cannot diverge.
In the course of the solution, we shall consider the following generalized version of the problem: Given intervals as above, and also a function h : I → R + , find J ⊆ I and a pricing p : E → R + , satisfying (2) and maximizing I∈J h(I, p).
Given a price function p : E → R + and a node w ∈ V , the accumulative price at any node u on the path [w, r] with respect to w is defined as p([w, u]). Obviously, this monotonically increases as u moves towards the root. In this section we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4
There is a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme for the tollbooth problem with uncrossing paths.
In the following, we fix K = ⌈log(nP )/ log(1 + ǫ)⌉.
Definition 5 (ǫ-Relative pricings) Let w ∈ V be a given node of T, and 0 ≤ k ≤ K and 0 ≤ k ′ ≤ 2 log 3/2 n be given integers. We call any selection of 
The total number of possible ǫ-relative pricings with respect to a given w ∈ V is at most
which is m polylog(m) for every fixed ǫ > 0.
on the path from (w, r], and p : E → R + be a pricing of E. We say that R is ǫ-consistent with p and L if
Lemma 1 Letp : E → R + be an ǫ-optimal pricing for a given instance of Tb, w ∈ V be an arbitrary node, and L = {s 1 , . . . , s k ′ } be the set of separators in N (T) on the path from (w, r]. Then there exists an ǫ-relative pricing R w.r.t. w, that is ǫ-consistent withp and L.
With every ǫ-relative pricing R, we can associate a system of linear inequalities, denoted by S(R), on a set of E variables {p(e) : e ∈ E}, consisting of the constraints (C1) and (C2), together with the non-negativity constraints p(e) ≥ 0. The feasible set for this system gives the set of all possible pricings with which R is ǫ-consistent. For two systems of inequalities S 1 , S 2 , we denote by S 1 ∧ S 2 the system obtained by combining their inequalities.
be an ǫ-relative pricing w.r.t. a node w ∈ V . Given an interval I ∈ I[w], we associate a value v(I, R) to I, defined with respect to R as follows: Let j(I) be the largest index such that u i j(I) is contained in I. Then, define v(I, R) = (1 + ǫ) j(I) . For a subset of intervals I ′ ⊆ I, we define, as usual, v(I ′ , R) = I∈I ′ v(I, R). It follows that for any ǫ-relative pricing R w.r.t. a node w ∈ V , any p : E → R + with which R is consistent, and any
Decomposition into two subproblems. Let w ∈ N (T) be a separator node.
such that the root r ∈ V R and w is the root of T L . We define two Tb instances (T L , I L ) and (T R , I R ) where:
In other words, the intervals passing through w, crossing from T L to T R are truncated in T L while all other intervals remain the same 1 . Note that from the choice of w, we have max{|V (T L )|, |V (T R )|} ≤ 2n 3 + 1, and both instances (T L , I L ) and (T R , I R ) are of the uncrossing type, with roots w and r, respectively.
The algorithm is shown in Figure 1 . It is initially called with an empty S, and with h(I) = 0 for all I ∈ I. The procedure iterates over all ǫ-relative pricings R, consistent with S, w.r.t. the middle edge e * , then recurses on the subsets of intervals to the left and right of e * . Intervals crossing from T L to T R will be truncated and their values will be charged to T L ; hence the corresponding budgets are reduced, and the corresponding h-values are increased.
Solving the base case. At the lowest level of recursion (either line 1 or 4), we have to solve a linear program defined by the system S. Note that the system may contain constraints on variables outside the current set of edges E of the current tree T (resulting from previous nodes of the recursion tree). However, we can reduce this LP to one that involves only variables in E. Indeed, any constraint that involves a variable not in E, has the form L ≤ p([w, u]) ≤ U , where u ∈ V (T), and w ∈ V (T) is a separator node such that there is another separator node w ′ ∈ V (T) on the path from w to u. Then when w ′ was considered in the recursion, a constraint of the form p([w, w ′ )] = q, for some value q, was appended to S (recall (C2) in the definition of consistent pricings). Now, we can replace the first constraint by the equivalent constraint L − q ≤ p([w ′ , u]) ≤ U − q, which only involves variables from E. This is exactly what procedure REDUCE(S, ·) does in lines 2 and 6.
When the procedure returns, we get a pricing p : E → R + and a set of intervals J ⊆ I which can be purchased under this pricing.
Theorem 4 follows from the following two lemmas. Input: An uncrossing Tb instance (T = (V, E), I) with root r, budgets and values B, h : I → R + , and a feasible system of inequalities S Output: A pricing p : E → R + and a subset J ⊆ I
return (p, ∅), where p is any feasible solution of S
foreach edge e of T do 6.
J (e) ← {I ∈ I : B(I) ≥ p(e)} 9.
return ((p(e) : e ∈ E), e∈E J (e)) 10. let w be a separator node of T and T L , T R , I 0 , I L , I R be as defined above 11. for every ǫ-relative pricing R w.r.t. w for which S ∧ S(R) is feasible do 12.
foreach I ∈ I 0 do 13.
let p be the pricing defined by p(e) = p 1 (e) if e ∈ E L and p(e) = p 1 (e) if e ∈ E R 18.
record (p, J ) 20. return the recorded solution with largest p(J ) + h(J ) value Recall that the highway problem is the special case of the tollbooth problem when the underlying graph is a path. In [15] , Guruswami, et al. considered the highway problem and gave a polynomial time algorithm when the maximum budget is bounded by a constant, and all the budgets are integral. Balcan and Blum [2] gave a constant factor approximation algorithm when all intervals have the same length. Breist and Krysta [6] showed that the problem is weakly NP-hard. In [14] , Grigoriev et al. showed that a restricted version of the problem when the prices are required to satisfy a monotonicity condition remains weakly NP-hard. In this section, we show that the problem is strongly NP-hard by a reduction from MAX-2-SAT.
Consider a MAX-2-SAT instance with n variables {x 1 , · · · , x n } and m clauses {C 1 , · · · , C m }. Let the variables be numbered 1, · · · , n. We construct a gadget for each variable and each clause. We start by describing the gadgets in our construction.
Variable Gadget
The variable gadget for each variable consists of two copies of the following basic gadget and a consistency gadget. We first describe the basic gadget, and then describe the consistency gadget and the construction of a variable gadget. Figure 2 . We now show that there are exactly two price assignments for {e 1 , · · · , e 4 } that gives us optimum profit.
Lemma 4 The maximum profit that can be obtained from a basic gadget is 18, and there are exactly two sets of prices that achieve this profit.
We call the price assignment (1, 2, 2, 1) to the edges e 1 , · · · , e 4 respectively, a TRUE assignment, and the price assignment (2, 1, 1, 2) to the edges e 1 , · · · , e 4 respectively, a FALSE assignment. The variable gadget is constructed on 8n + 1 edges (e 4n , e 4n−1 , · · · , e 1 , h, f 1 , · · · , f 4n ), where n is the number of variables in the MAX-2-SAT instance. Each variable gadget consists of two copies of the basic gadget, along with a consistency gadget. The consistency gadget ensures that the two basic gadgets have the same price assignment, i.e., both set to TRUE, or both set to FALSE. More formally, let (x 1 , · · · , x n ) be an order on the variables of the MAX-2-SAT instance. Then, the gadget for variable x i , consists of two basic gadgets, B 1 i and B 2 i . B 1 i consists of intervals (customers) interested in the edges e 4i−3 , · · · , e 4i and B 2 i consists of intervals interested in the edges f 4i−3 , · · · , f 4i . Finally, the intervals ensuring consistency of the gadget for variable x i spans from e 4i−1 , · · · , f 4i−3 . The consistency gadget consists of a single interval that has a budget of mn 2 + 6(2i − 2) + 6. Finally, we add a new type of interval, called a type H interval that is interested only in the edge h, and has a budget of mn 2 . Figure 3 shows the arrangement of the variable gadgets. We now show that the consistency intervals do their job. i.e., if for a variable gadget, B 1 i and B 2 i have different price assignments, we obtain a smaller profit than when they are the same. 
Lemma 5
The maximum profit of 2mn 2 + 6(2i − 2) + 6 + 36 from a variable gadget and the interval h is achieved only when both the basic gadgets corresponding to a variable are consistent, and the type H interval purchases edge h at a price of mn 2 .
We will create several copies of the basic gadgets, the consistency gadgets for each variable as well as several copies of the H interval to ensure that in an optimum price
Figure 4: This table shows the lengths and budgets of the intervals making up a clause gadget for the four different kinds of clauses. assignment, the basic gadgets are consistent, and the reduction goes through. But before we do this, we describe the clause gadgets.
Clause Gadgets
The clause gadget for a clause of variables x i and x j runs between the basic gadget B 1 i and B 2 j . There are four types of clause gadgets corresponding to the four types of clauses. Each clause gadget consists of one interval. These intervals have the property that we obtain a certain revenue from the clause interval if and only if the clause is satisfied; otherwise we obtain nothing. The clause gadgets for the four types of clauses are shown in Table 4 and in Figures 6, 7, 8 , and 9 in the Appendix.
We say that a pricing is consistent if for every variable, the price assignment to the two basic gadgets of the variable gadget are both TRUE or both FALSE, and the consistency intervals spend their entire budgets.
Lemma 6
Consider a clause C consisting of variables x i and x j and a consistent price assignment to the edges. Then, the intervals corresponding to C will be able to purchase their desired edges if and only if the corresponding truth assignment to the variables satisfies the clause C.
NP-hardness
We now describe the final reduction. As mentioned earlier, we have to create copies of the variable gadget, consistency gadget and the H interval for the proof to go through. We make T copies of each basic gadget, of each consistency gadget, and of the H interval, where any value of T , larger than m 2 n 3 will suffice for the proof. Observe that for a variable gadget again, the profit maximizing prices achieve consistency of the variable gadget, and making T copies of the H intervals ensures that the price of the edge h is set to mn 2 .
Theorem 7
The highway problem is strongly NP-hard. Each edges e is partitioned in edges e 1 (fat) and e 2 (dotted). Which is which is arbitrary. The notation 1x B=2 means that there is one customer with budget 2 on this type of edge.
APX-hardness in the discount model

Proof.
We will show that the problem is equivalent to a pricing problem on bipartite graphs and prove that the latter problem is APX-hard. Assume we are given an instance of the highway problem in which edge e is contained in each of the intervals. We split edge e by adding a node v 0 on e. This has no effect on the problem. We construct a bipartite graph H with one set consisting of the points left of v 0 and the other set consisting of the points right of v 0 . Now, an interval containing e becomes an edge in the bipartite graph. The items are the vertices and a customer is interested in the two items on the vertices of its edge. Given a pricing p for the highway instance, we define the pricing q p of H by letting the price of a vertex v in H be the cumulative price p([v 0 , v]). Conversely, for any pricing q of the vertices of H there is a corresponding pricing p of the highway problem such that q = q p .
We prove that the pricing problem on bipartite graphs is APX-hard by a reduction from maxcut on 3-regular graphs. Given a 3-regular graph G = (V, E), we make it bipartite by placing an extra vertex v e on every edge e, dividing it in two new edges e 1 and e 2 . For e 1 there is one customer with budget 2 and for e 2 there are two customers with budget 1 and one customer with budget 3. We define one extra vertex v 0 and define for each v ∈ V an edge a v = (v, v 0 ). For each such edge a v there are ten customers with budget 1 and ten customers with budget 2. The bipartite graph partitions into V and the new vertices V ′ = {v e | e ∈ E} ∪ {v 0 }. (To enhance reading we write prices and budgets in decimal and amounts of customers in words.)
Consider any pricing p of the bipartite graph. We may assume that p(v 0 ) = 0 since subtracting p(v 0 ) from all vertices in V ′ and adding p(v 0 ) to all vertices in V does not change the profit. We will have to take into account though that prices may be negative.
Next, we argue that in any optimal solution the price p(v) of any vertex v ∈ V is either 1 or 2. Denote by p(e) the profit we get from the customer on e 1 plus the three customers on e 2 . It is easy to see that 3 ≤ p(e) ≤ 5 for any edge e. Suppose p(v) = α / ∈ {1, 2}. If α > 2 or α ≤ 0 then the profit on a v is 0. By changing the price to p(v) = 2 the profit becomes ten times 2 is 20. The maximum profit on any of the three adjacent edges e is 5. Hence, we gain 20 and loose at most 15. Now assume 0 < α < 1. We raise the price of v to price p(v) = 1 and reduce the price on the vertices v e by 1 − α for each of the three adjacent edges e of v in G. The 20 customers on a v add an extra 20(1 − α) to the profit. No other customer sees an increase of its bundle price and at most 9 customers will see a reduction of the bundle price. Hence, we loose at most 9(1 − α) on them. Now assume 1 < α < 2. We raise the price to p(v) = 2 and reduce the price on the vertices v e of adjacent edges e by 2 − α. The argument is the same: We gain 10(2 − α) and loose at most 9(2 − α) since at most 9 customers will see their bundle price drop.
We showed that there is an optimal pricing in which p(v 0 ) = 0 and p(v) ∈ {1, 2} for all v ∈ V . Next we prove that there is a cut of size k in G if and only if the maximum profit is 20|V | + 4|E| + k. Given a cut of size k we price the vertices on one side 1 and on the other side 2. Now consider an edge e = (v, w) ∈ E with p(v) = p(w) = 1. We can get a profit p(e) = 4 by setting p(v e ) = 0 or p(v e ) = 1. This is also the maximum profit possible. Similarly, if p(v) = p(w) = 2 then we can get the maximum profit p(e) = 4 by setting p(v e ) = 0. Finally, if p(v) = 1 and p(w) = 2 then we can get the maximum possible profit p(e) = 5 by setting p(v e ) = 0 or p(v e ) = 1, depending on how we chose e 1 and e 2 . From the customers on edges adjacent to v 0 we get the maximum profit of 20 per edge. The total profit is exactly 20|V |+ 5k + 4(|E|− k) = 20n + 4|E|+ k and this is maximum possible if the maximum cut is k. The reduction is gap-preserving since 3|V | = 2|E| and |E| ≤ 2k.
In the reduction we showed that there always is an optimal pricing of the bipartite graph with only non-negative prices. Hence, the bipartite graph pricing problem remains APX-hard if we restrict to non-negative prices.
Corollary 1
The graph pricing problem is APX-hard on bipartite graphs and all budgets in {1, 2, 3}. This holds for the non-negative version as well as for the version with negative prices allowed.
Guruswami et al. [15] show that the graph-pricing problem is APX-hard even if all budgets are 1. Note that the bipartite case is trivially solved in that case by setting a price of 1 to all items on one side.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the tollbooth problem on trees, which is better than the upper bound currently known for the general problem. Improving this bound is an interesting open problem. One plausible direction towards this is to use as a subroutine, the quasi-polynomial time algorithm for the case of uncrossing paths. Such techniques have been used before, for example for the multicut problem on trees [12] . However, it is unclear how a general instance of the Tb problem can be decomposed into a set of problems of the uncrossing type. For the highway problem, the strong NP-hardness presented in this paper shows that the problem is almost closed, modulo improving the running time from quasi-polynomial to polynomial. budget, and we obtain a profit of 2mn 2 + 6(2i − 2) + 6 + 36. Suppose B 1 i is TRUE and B 2 i is FALSE. Then, we are forced to set the price of edge h to mn 2 − 1, otherwise the consistency gadget is unable to purchase it's edges and we lose at least mn 2 + 6(2i − 2) + 6 from the total profit. However, by setting p(h) = mn 2 − 1, the maximum profit we obtain is at most (mn 2 − 1) + mn 2 + 6(2i − 2) + 36, which is smaller than the maximum profit by 1 unit. On the other hand, if B 1 i is FALSE, and B 2 i is TRUE, we lose 1 unit from the maximum profit since we cannot raise the price of edge h to more than mn 2 , and the consistency gadget is unable to spend it's entire budget. Hence, the maximum profit is obtained only when the variable gadget is consistent.
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider a consistent price assignment, with the edge h having a price of n 2 and a clause (x i ∨ x j ). If the clause (x i ∨ x j ) is not satisfied, then the gadgets for variables x i and x j have a FALSE price assignment, and the prices for the edges in the gadgets for x i and x j are 2, 1, 1, 2, and 2, 1, 1, 2 respectively. Then, it is easy to see that the price of the bundle of the clause interval in this case is mn 2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 4, exceeding the budget of the clause interval. In the other three cases, the price of the bundle is at most mn 2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 3, and the profit from the clause interval is at least mn 2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 2 (In the case when both x i and x j are TRUE, the profit is mn 2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 2, in the two other satisfying assignments the profit is mn 2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 3). The proofs for the other types of clauses (x i ∨ x j ), (x i ∨ x j ), and (x i ∨ x j ) are similar.
Proof of Theorem 7. Suppose the instance of MAX-2-SAT has k satisfied clauses. We set the prices for the edges corresponding to the two basic gadgets corresponding to the variable x i to TRUE if x i = 1 and FALSE otherwise. We set the price of edge h to n 2 . This gives a total profit of
(mn 2 + 6(2i − 2) + 6) + T · mn 2 + kmn 2 + O(kn)
The first term of the sum comes from the basic gadgets of each variable set to TRUE or FALSE, the second term comes from the consistency gadgets, the third term comes from the H intervals, and the last two terms, from the satisfied clause gadgets.
To show the reverse direction, consider a price assignment that achieves a profit of at least S. We claim that in an optimal price assignment, the gadgets corresponding to the variables are all consistent, and the edge h has a price of mn 2 . Note first that the maximum profit we can gain from all the clauses is O(m 2 n 2 ). Now, if we have larger than, say T = m 3 n 2 copies of each variable gadget, it follows from Lemma 5 that we only lose by making either the variable gadgets inconsistent, or if the H intervals and the consistency gadgets do not spend their entire budget. Hence, in the optimal solution, the variables are consistent, and h has a price of mn 2 . This then leaves only the clause intervals. Note that our profit maximizing pricing will try to maximize the number of clause intervals satisfied, since the clause intervals differ by at most O(n) in their budgets, but their individual budgets themselves are at least mn 2 . By the obvious assignment of truth values to the variables from the variable price assignment, we get an assignment that satisfies k clauses.
